

TOP SECRET

28 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense,  
27 March 1980 (U)

25X1C 1. SecDef raised the question of an SCC-approved plan to increase intelligence collection in [REDACTED] (I'd like to see just what the SCC and Presidentially-approved decision was there--how specific it is on what should be done.) NSA and DIA have developed a plan for how they could implement this SCC decision. They've developed it at three levels of resources. They are unable to get State Department approval for the increases in manpower they want. Secretary Brown wasn't sure whether they also are asking in this plan for increases in money over the '80 and '81 budgets. The plan they have will be ready by the end of this week and they will coordinate it with us before sending it to the SCC to resolve the issue of whether the SCC wants to increase intelligence collection or adhere to the mode ceilings. (S/NF)

25X1C 2. I raised with him the problem of [REDACTED] and told him we were about to submit to the SCC for its 7 April meeting a regional covert action plan. (S/NF)

3. The Secretary had recently read a book by a Soviet author called Moscow Diary. He mentioned how the Soviets had regularly tried to impress the Shah with their military might just before entering into some form of negotiation with him. He wondered if we could collect examples of their doing this kind of thing as a pressure tactic, e.g., inviting delegations from various countries to witness exercises or military displays just in advance of some form of negotiation. For instance, he said that they built up their forces on the Czechoslovakian borders in 1948 just prior to the coup there as a means of strengthening Gottwald's and other Communist hands. He was not asking for a major

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effort on this. He thought it might be an interesting case study, however. In that connection I'd like to get an update of where our quest for a historian stands. There was some committee working on this. I'm anxious that it not drag out to where we go further without a historian. (C/NF)

4. He wondered if there was some way of using third parties to get information to the current Iranian government about the Soviet infiltration of Azerbaijan, their moving of the Communist Baluchi leaders back and forth in different areas, etc. DoD is working up some proposals on how to do this but he thought it really should be

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5. The Secretary sent me a copy of a memo to the SCC asking that the SCC resolve a dispute between NSA and the Attorney General [redacted] operations. NSA has asked for [redacted] under PD 24 the Attorney General is saying that they need not do it.

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6. He indicated he was going to rescind [redacted] reduction of [redacted] under the DoD budget exercise. (S/NF)

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7. I raised the issue of [redacted] operation with him. He is amenable to it being acknowledged in extremis that this was a DoD operation. We talked about various possible excuses. He was

25X9  
8. We talked about the biological warfare issue [redacted]

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25X9 [REDACTED]

25X1C 9. We had a discussion about Afghanistan and I gave a recounting of my discussion with the [REDACTED] today. He seemed generally to agree with it. (S/NF)

10. I delivered the two papers on Afghanistan--the memo to me on what our intelligence requirements were of Soviet equipment in Afghanistan, and my response to his memorandum on analyzing Soviet activity in Afghanistan. (S/NF)

11. I delivered the paper on what you could learn from [REDACTED] He had been briefed by his people and they had come to the same general conclusion. (S/NF)

25X1A 12. I discussed the [REDACTED] He had not heard of this one. I told him I was raising it because [REDACTED] was pressuring us to pressure them. We were not taking any position [REDACTED] on whether this was a good program for them or not. (S/NF)

[REDACTED]  
STANFIELD TURNER  
Director

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SC-05126-80

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	PB/NSC		
4			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE

**TOP SECRET**

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. SC-05126-80

*Cy #3 of 6*

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
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**TOP SECRET**

(Security Classification)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM		6		
4	DD/NFA	3,8	1,9,10,11		
5	DD/CT	1			
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	2,4,7	1,3,9,12		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	PB/NSC	X			
19	C/LA/DDO		1,2		
20	SA/DCI/CI	5			
21	C/NE/DDO		12		
22	ES		X		

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

Paragraphs extracted for action or info as indicated above.

By Executive Secretary

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI) Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM	5			
4	DD/NFA	3	2,4		
5	DD/CT	4,7	2,3,5,10		
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	2,5	1,4		
8	DD/S&T		10		
9	GC	1,3	8		
10	LC		5,8		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	DD/NSC		X		
19	ES		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

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Executive Secretary

24 April 1980

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	PB/NSC		
2			
3			
4			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CORRECTION	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

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CONTROL NO. 029-80

Cy # 4

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**- TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT**

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



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23 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,  
22 April 1980 (U)



2. The Secretary indicated he'd asked us to see if we had any assets that could get information about the Havana conference of Central American leaders that was held about a month ago. I frankly don't recall anything about this. He believes I said we might have some assets that could help here. Have we had any input from any source on what went on in this conference? (S/NF)

3. He expressed concern over the draft directive on competitive analyses. He mentioned his SIGINT responsibilities. I indicated I did not see NSA as being a player in competitive analyses. What analysis NSA does is for their own internal use. I would not task them to do a competitive analysis. What he was suggesting was that there be an NFIB review of this directive. My recollection is that I cleared it in the rough and that it was going to the NFIB, but I'm not positive of that. We ought to snoop around and find out what is behind the Secretary's people putting him up to raising this one--what turf issue have they got in mind? This ties in with WSSIC memo I just saw. Have [redacted] look at this whole problem re DCI authorities on dissemination issue. (C/NF)

HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE-  
[redacted] CONTROL CHANNELS JOINTLY

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4. We talked about [REDACTED] After considerable discussion, we agreed that we would each (and then hopefully jointly) develop a series of steps that we could progressively take to placate and later satisfy the [REDACTED] We could then decide how and where to draw a line at different stages. I would have in mind things like: [REDACTED] give the quarterly briefings that we have already planned and organized; [REDACTED] [REDACTED] allow access to all the [REDACTED] providing access to, but no retention of, all photography including [REDACTED] providing retention of aircraft photography; providing retention of aircraft [REDACTED] photography; establishing a joint photo interpretation center in which all photography would be kept under U.S. control, but only aircraft [REDACTED] supplied; providing [REDACTED] in which all photography would be available but under U.S. control; or providing all photography for retention [REDACTED] The Secretary says he has no set view on how far down such a list we should go. (TS/TK [REDACTED])

5. He asked about the status of the NFIP in Congress for '81. I need an update--I really didn't have many facts at my disposal here. He felt [REDACTED] was safely through the Senate and wondered how it was doing in the House. I said my only concern with the budget at this point was to be sure [REDACTED] stayed in and I thought it was doing well at the present time. (TS/TK [REDACTED])

7. We talked about SATCOM IV. I pointed the problem out to him. I don't believe he had been in on it before. He was sympathetic to the difficulties. He thought we ought to look at two alternatives-- [REDACTED]

8. We discussed the subject of charters. I described my meeting with Senator Huddleston. I pointed out the problem that is looming over the horizon as to whether the mini-charter does or does not include the entity charters. I mentioned my concern that NSA was lobbying this issue totally independently and might thereby diminish our chances of getting any charter. (C/NF)

9. We had a separate discussion on Iran. (C/NF)

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10. We had a good discussion on IS-2 and -3. (S/NF)

11. It was 6:30 by the time we finished. I didn't get to any of the other items. I think we can drop increased intelligence collection in [REDACTED] Keep the military force as a pressure tactic one. Drop third parties info to the Iranian government. Hang on to the military balance. Send the President's report and the NIE on their own. Leave in U.S. and [REDACTED] (S/NF)

[REDACTED]  
STANFIELD TURNER  
Director

HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE-  
[REDACTED] CONTROL CHANNELS JOINTLY

[REDACTED] 029-80

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AGENDA  
for  
22 April 1980 Meeting with SecDef/DepSecDef

Following your Memorandum for the Record of the last (27 March) meeting are tabs with topics for discussion this week.

<u>TAB</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
A <i>covered</i>	General Items
B <i>covered</i>	[REDACTED] 25X1
C <i>drop</i>	[REDACTED] 25X1
D <i>drop</i>	BW-Related Incident at Sverdlovsk (came out of last meeting)
E <i>not covered</i>	Soviet Use of Military Force as a Pressure Tactic: Brown's request based on reading book <u>Moscow Diary</u> (came out of last meeting)
F <i>drop</i>	Third parties to get info to Iranian Government (came out of last meeting)
G <i>not covered</i>	Military Balance Presidential Briefing
H <i>not delivered; EE forwarded on 4/23/80.</i>	Deliver "The President's Report on Soviet Forces"
I <i>not delivered; EE forwarded; on 4/23/80.</i>	Deliver NIE 11-3/8-79
J <i>covered</i>	Mention your memo to President on IS-2/3 health situation?
K <i>covered</i>	[REDACTED] 25
L <i>not covered</i>	The US and [REDACTED] - Deep Troubles 25

Additional items covered (See MemCon):

- Havana conference on Central American leaders
- Draft directive on competitive analyses
- Status of NFIP in Congress for 1981
- Charters

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25X1C

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